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A NEW TWIST ON AN OLD STORY: LAWFARE AND THE MIXING OF 
PROPORTIONALITIES 
Laurie R. Blank* 
The claim that a just cause erases any wrongs committed in war is 
an old story, just like the opposite claim that an unjust cause renders all 
acts unlawful. International law has traditionally reinforced a strict separa-
tion between jus ad bellum—the law governing the resort to force—and jus 
in bello—the law governing the conduct of hostilities and protection of per-
sons during conflict. Nonetheless, we see today a new twist on this old story 
that threatens the separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello from 
the opposite perspective. In essence, there is an ever-louder claim that ex-
cessive civilian deaths under jus in bello proportionality render an entire 
military operation unjust under jus ad bellum.  
Protection of civilians is a central purpose of international humani-
tarian law (IHL) and media coverage of conflict and civilian deaths is criti-
cal to efforts to minimize human suffering during war. However, insurgent 
groups and terrorists exploit this greater focus on civilian casualties to 
their own advantage through tactics often termed ―lawfare,‖ such as hu-
man shields, perfidy, and other unlawful tactics. Not only do they seek 
greater protection for their fighters, but they also use the resulting civilian 
casualties as a tool of war. This article analyzes the growing use of alleged 
violations of jus in bello proportionality to make claims of disproportionate 
force under jus ad bellum. In doing so, it highlights the strategic and opera-
tional ramifications for combat operations and the impact on investigations 
and analyses of IHL compliance and accountability. Ultimately, this new 
twist on an old story has significant consequences for the application of 
IHL, for decisions to use force, and for the implementation of strategic, op-
erational, and tactical goals during conflict. Most of all, it places civilians 
in increasing danger because it encourages tactics and strategies that di-
rectly harm them. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The claim that a just cause erases any wrongs committed in war is 
an old story, just like the opposite claim that an unjust cause renders all acts 
unlawful. Empires, countries, nation-states—for hundreds of years, all have 
argued that a rightful cause makes all acts just—even rape, pillage, murder 
of civilians, and other acts ordinarily considered criminal under domestic 
and international law.  
Yet the law states otherwise. International humanitarian law (IHL), 
otherwise known as the law of armed conflict or the law of war, rests on the 
equal application of the law to all parties to an armed conflict. All parties 
must abide by the same obligations and all parties enjoy the same protec-
tions under the law, regardless of the reason they fight, the capabilities of 
their armies, or the likelihood of their success. With the protection of indi-
viduals at the heart of IHL, this cause-blind application of the law is a criti-
cal feature enabling the greatest measure of protection for the greatest num-
ber of persons—the law simply does not countenance diminished protection 
for individuals because of the supposed rightness or wrongness of their gov-
ernment‘s policies or decisions to go to war. 
Two bodies of law apply to the use of armed force. Jus ad bellum, 
the law governing the resort to force, is based on the U.N. Charter frame-
work and prohibits the use of force by one state against another, except in 
self-defense or in cases authorized by the U.N. Security Council.1 Jus in 
bello, the law governing the conduct of hostilities and protection of persons 
during conflict, is codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions and pro-
vides a clear framework for the treatment of civilians and combatants, the 
  
 1 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art. 39, art. 51. 
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targeting of persons and objects, belligerent occupation, and the means and 
methods and warfare.2 Since medieval times, international law has rein-
forced a strict separation between the two. This separation mandates that all 
parties have the same obligations and rights during armed conflict to ensure 
that all persons and property benefit from the protection of the laws of war. 
For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly held that Germany‘s crime 
of aggression neither rendered all German acts unlawful, nor prevented 
German soldiers from benefitting from the protections of the jus in bello.3 
More recently, the Special Court for Sierra Leone refused to reduce the sen-
tences of Civil Defense Forces fighters because they fought in a ―legitimate 
war‖ to protect the government against the rebels.4 The basic principle that 
the rights and obligations of jus in bello apply regardless of the justness or 
unjustness of the overall military operation thus remains firmly entrenched. 
Nonetheless, we see today a new twist on this old story, one that 
threatens this historical and critical separation between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello from the opposite perspective. This new story stems from the 
growing—but not new—tendency to conflate the requirement of a propor-
tionate response under jus ad bellum with the principle of proportionality 
under jus in bello. As explained in greater detail below, the former man-
  
 2 See War and International Humanitarian Law, Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross (Oct. 29, 
2009) http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm. The law of armed 
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Gene-
va Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [herei-
nafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted 
by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. The 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions govern the means and methods of warfare. Hague Convention No. II 
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 
No. 403; Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]. 
 3 See Trial of Josef Altstötter et. al., 6 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM‘N, LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 2 (1948); United States v. List (Case 7), XI TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMES BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1247 (1948) (citing OPPENHEIM, 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51–52 (Longman 1920)). See also section II.C. infra. 
 4 Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 529–30 
(May 28, 2008), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY 
%3d&tabid=194 (holding that mitigation for political reasons would give legitimacy to con-
duct that violates the law). 
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dates that any use of force in self-defense be necessary and proportionate in 
defeating or deterring an attack by another state. The latter principle re-
quires soldiers not to attack a target if the expected innocent casualties are 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. Mixing 
the two proportionalities leads to common but incorrect analyses: (1) civi-
lian casualties become determinative of the proportionality of a state‘s re-
sponse to an armed attack and (2) the lawfulness of the use of force plays a 
role in whether an attack on a particular target during a conflict results in 
legitimate collateral damage or a disproportionate attack on civilians in vi-
olation of the law of war. Neither of these arguments is an appropriate ap-
plication of proportionality—whether under jus ad bellum or under jus in 
bello. 
The burgeoning use of ―lawfare‖—defined here as the exploitation 
of the law of war for strategic and tactical purposes—as a tool of war com-
pounds this effect. Insurgents co-mingle with the civilian population, launch 
attacks from protected buildings, and seek to exploit militaries‘ adherence to 
the law of war to gain advantages on the ground and in the public relations 
arena. Modern asymmetrical conflicts—exemplified by NATO operations 
in Afghanistan and by Operation Cast Lead in Gaza—are marked by exten-
sive intermingling between civilians and fighters, fighting in civilian areas 
and tactics that tax the jus in bello principle of proportionality to the limits. 
In particular, the concurrence of counterinsurgency operations and tactical 
exploitation of the law of war produces consistent media coverage fo-
cused—reasonably so—on civilian casualties and collateral damage. We see 
this, for example, in Afghanistan, where coalition attacks resulting in civi-
lian casualties gain comprehensive media attention but insurgent attacks 
with deadly effect among civilians receive significantly less glare from the 
spotlights. 
At the same time, these developments have opened the door for this 
alternative take on the old tale of just war. Unlike the past, when jus ad bel-
lum arguments were used to reach particular claims about jus in bello, we 
now see the use of jus in bello claims to make arguments about the validity 
of an operation under the jus ad bellum. In effect, there is an ever-louder 
claim that allegedly excessive civilian deaths under IHL, the law governing 
the conduct of hostilities, render an entire military operation unjust under 
jus ad bellum, the law governing the resort to force. However, just as the 
crime of aggression does not turn otherwise lawful acts into war crimes, so 
the finding that an attack on a particular target was disproportionate should 
not automatically render the use of force unlawful. 
This article will examine how the mixing of proportionalities and 
the growing use of lawfare have led to this new twist on an old story. The 
first section will provide a foundation of applicable law and jurisprudence, 
examining the two proportionalities and analyzing how international juri-
sprudence has repeatedly and consistently affirmed the separation between 
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the two bodies of law. The second section will explore the concept of law-
fare and how the technologically disadvantaged party in asymmetrical con-
flict often takes advantage of jus in bello legal obligations to hinder the 
military operations of the more advantaged party. In the third section, this 
article analyzes how these two components have now merged into a new 
story about proportionality in asymmetrical warfare. In particular, the im-
pact of global media coverage of conflict exacerbates the inherent difficul-
ties in assessing proportionality.  
Although the law is clear that proportionality is a prospective analy-
sis that looks only at the expected civilian casualties and the anticipated 
military advantage, current conflicts see a steady erosion towards a retros-
pective analysis driven by media coverage of civilian casualties and, in cer-
tain cases, exploitation of that coverage. Lawfare thus now affects not only 
the conduct of hostilities, but investigations and analysis after the fact. 
These challenges produce several key questions, including: the impact of 
asymmetrical warfare on the application of both jus in bello and jus ad bel-
lum; the interpretation of the jus ad bellum requirements of necessary and 
proportionate; the interpretation of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I; and 
the impact of these developments on the actual conduct of hostilities, media 
coverage of conflict, and public perception of military operations. Recent 
developments, including the revised International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) tactical doctrines in Afghanistan and the Goldstone Report, high-
light the importance of these questions.  
The jus in bello principle of proportionality—like the law of armed 
conflict itself—is based on a delicate balance between military necessity 
and humanity. The new trend in conflating the two proportionalities risks 
tearing the fabric of that delicate balance, perhaps in ways that cannot be 
repaired. To maintain the law‘s ability to protect civilians while still enabl-
ing effective military operations, it is essential to simultaneously preserve 
the separation between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum principles of 
proportionality and not let one drive determinations about the other. 
II. THE TWO PROPORTIONALITIES: THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Analyzing situations of armed conflict involves both jus in bello 
and jus ad bellum, as explained above. The modern foundations of jus in 
bello, which dates back hundreds, indeed thousands, of years,5 lie in the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
International legal constraints on the resort to force, in contrast, are much 
more recent in origin. The U.N. Charter is the primary framework for mod-
  
 5 See generally Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to 
World War II, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 176 (2000). 
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ern jus ad bellum, which dates back to the 1919 Covenant of the League of 
Nations and 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.6  
Proportionality plays an important role in both legal regimes, which 
can be a common source of confusion and—at times—the trigger for prob-
lematic legal interpretations and applications. Regarding the conduct of 
hostilities, proportionality in the jus in bello balances military necessity and 
humanity by prohibiting attacks in which the expected civilian casualties 
would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. 
In analyzing the resort to force under the jus ad bellum, proportionality lim-
its the power to use force in response to an armed attack, assessing whether 
a state‘s military operation exceeded what was necessary to defend the state. 
A key distinction, particularly for the strategic issues addressed in this ar-
ticle, is that jus ad bellum proportionality is unconcerned with the extent of 
civilian casualties, unlike jus in bello proportionality, in which civilian ca-
sualties play a central role.  
A.  Proportionality in the Jus Ad Bellum 
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by one state against 
another in Article 2(4): ―All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.‖7 The Charter also provides two excep-
tions to that prohibition, such that force can be used in self-defense against 
an armed attack under Article 51 or as part of a U.N.-authorized operation 
under Chapter VII.
8
 Article 51 recognizes the ―inherent right‖ of states to 
use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack: ―Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions.‖9 The central features of the right to self-defense are that force used is 
necessary and proportionate to the goal of repelling the attack or ending the 
grievance.10  
  
 6 Covenant of the League of Nations, Preamble, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 (―In 
order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security 
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war‖); Treaty Between the United States and 
Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 
1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (―The High Contracting Parties solemnly 
declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in 
their relations with one another.‖). 
 7 U.N. Charter, supra note 1, art. 2(4). 
 8 Id. art. 43, 51. 
 9 Id. art. 51. 
 10 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opi-
nion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Case Concerning Military 
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The Caroline Incident provides the classic formulation of the para-
meters of self-defense. British troops crossed the Niagara River to the Unit-
ed States side and attacked the steamer Caroline, which had been running 
arms and materiel to insurgents on the Canadian side.11 The attack set fire to 
the Caroline and killed one American. The British claimed that they were 
acting in self-defense in response to the insurgents‘ provocations.12 In a 
letter to his British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, U.S. Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster declared that the use of force in self-defense should be li-
mited to ―cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion.‖13 Furthermore, the force used must not be ―unreasonable or excessive; 
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by 
that necessity, and kept clearly within it.‖14  
The primary issue in analyzing jus ad bellum proportionality is 
whether the defensive use of force is appropriate in relation to the ends 
sought, measuring the extent of the use of force against the overall military 
goals, such as fending off an attack or subordinating the enemy. This pro-
portionality focuses not on some measure of symmetry between the original 
attack and the use of force in response, but on whether the measure of coun-
ter-force used is proportionate to the needs and goals of repelling or deter-
ring the original attack.15 As a report to the International Law Commission 
explains:  
[I]t would be mistaken . . . to think that there must be proportionality be-
tween the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. 
The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume 
dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters 
  
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 237 (June 27, 1986); Jus ad Bellum (Ethiopia v. Eritrea), Ethiopia‘s Claims 1–8, 
Partial Award (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org. 
 11 Hunter Miller, British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 
2011). 
 12 Id. (―[T]he destruction of the Caroline was an act of necessary self-defense.‖ (quoting a 
letter from Mr. Fox, the British minister at Washington, to Mr. Forsyth, U.S. Secretary of 
State)). 
 13 Id. (reproducing a letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashbur-
ton, Special British Minister (Aug. 6, 1842) (quoting a former communication from this 
Department to the British Plenipotentiary here, that stated the exceptions to the ―inviolable 
character of the territory of independent States.‖). 
 14 Id. 
 15 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 225 (2005); See also Michael 
N. Schmitt, ―Change Direction‖ 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International 
Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 127, 129 (2007–2008). 
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in this respect is the result to be achieved by the ―defensive‖ action, and 
not the forms, substance and strength of the action itself.
16
 
In both Nicaragua v. United States and Armed Activities on the Ter-
ritory of the Congo, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed that pro-
portionality focuses on the degree of force needed to eliminate the danger or 
repel the attack.17 The Court declared in the latter case that the Ugandan 
operations capturing ―airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from 
Uganda‘s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder 
attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence.‖18 Thus, a vi-
olation of jus ad bellum proportionality only occurs when ―the defender 
[does] more than reasonably required in the circumstances to deter a threat-
ened attack or defeat an ongoing one.‖19  
B.   Proportionality in the Jus in Bello 
The jus in bello principle of proportionality requires that parties re-
frain from attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive 
in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. A balance of mili-
tary necessity and humanity, this principle is at the foundation of two criti-
cal aspects of IHL. First, the means and methods of attacking the enemy are 
not unlimited. Rather, the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy. Second, the legal prohibition against targeting 
civilians does not correspondingly mean that all civilian deaths are viola-
tions of the law. Even though a ―legitimate target may not be attacked if the 
collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific mili-
tary gain from the attack,‖20 the law has always tolerated ―[t]he incidence of 
some civilian casualties . . . as a consequence of military action.‖21 Military 
  
 16 Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7, ¶ 121, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT‘L L. COMM‘N 13, 69 (1980). 
 17 Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 237; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Con-
go (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19); See also JUDITH GAIL 
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 158 (2004) (ex-
plaining that in the Nicaragua case, the Court held that, ―the approach is not to focus on the 
nature of the attack itself and ask what is a proportionate response but rather to determine 
what is proportionate to achieving the legitimate goal under the Charter, the repulsion of the 
attack.‖). 
 18 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 147. 
 19 Schmitt, supra note 15, at 154 (emphasizing that assessments of the Israeli response to 
Hezbollah rocket attacks must be on the basis of the force needed to end the attacks, not on 
the relation between the attacks and the force used). 
 20 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10, at 587, ¶ 20 (J. Higgins, dissenting). 
 21 See Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 275, 
283–84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
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commanders and decision makers must therefore assess the advantage to be 
gained from an attack in light of the likely civilian casualties. 
The laws of war have incorporated these ideas since long before the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the modern formulation of proportio-
nality in Additional Protocol I.22 Indeed, jus in bello proportionality has 
long historical roots, stemming from St. Thomas Aquinas‘ ―doctrine of 
double effect,‖23 essentially ―a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition 
against attacking noncombatants with the legitimate conduct of military 
activity.‖24 The principle of proportionality, which is well accepted as an 
element of customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts,25 
appears in three separate provisions in Additional Protocol I. In establishing 
the basic parameters of the obligation to protect civilians and the civilian 
population, Article 51 prohibits any ―attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated.‖26 This language demon-
strates that Additional Protocol I contemplates incidental civilian casualties, 
  
 22 See generally Francis Lieber, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, arts. 14, 15, 22 (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
FULL/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code]. Although the Lieber Code does not 
include a specific statement of the principle of proportionality, the early underpinnings of the 
concept can be seen in the following three statements: in art. 14 ―[m]ilitary necessity . . . 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of 
the war‖ ; in art. 15 ―[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of 
‗armed‘ enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally ‗unavoidable‘ in the 
armed contests of the war‖; and in art. 22 ―the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, 
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.‖ 
 23 See Saint Thomas Aquinas, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 225–27 (Richard J. 
Regan & William P. Baumgarth, eds. 1988), available at http://www.op.org/summa/summa-
II-IIq64.html (describing II-II, quatro 64, art.7 ―[w]hether it is lawful to kill a man in self-
defense?‖ as having ―two effects‖). 
 24 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 153 (Basic Books 4th ed., 2006). 
 25 See 1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Hu-
manitarian Law: Rules, Rule 14, at 46, 48–49 (2009) (―Rule 14. Launching an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civi-
lian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. ―) [hereinafter CIHL]; see Michael 
N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 
2006), available at http://www.estig.ipbeja.pt/~ac_direito/FaultLinesintheLawofTargeting. 
pdf; see also Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva 
Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
ENGLISH LAW 63, 76–77 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993) (noting the application of the principle of 
proportionality in Protocol I during the first Gulf War as a part of customary international 
law). 
 26 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(5)(b). 
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and appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii)27 and 57(2)(b),28 which specific-
ally cover precautions in attack.  
Although it may seem straightforward to declare that militaries 
should never attack when the loss of innocent life will outweigh any mili-
tary benefit from the attack, in practice applying proportionality is rarely 
clear-cut because it compares civilian harm and military advantage, two 
dissimilar factors. As one commentator glibly explained, military com-
manders are not issued a ―proportionometer‖ to help them make such calcu-
lations.29 Comparing the destruction of a munitions factory—or, in Gaza, a 
storage facility for rockets—to the number of civilian deaths or serious inju-
ries is difficult, perhaps impossible. Even though ―balance‖ or ―weighing‖ 
are the most common terms used when discussing proportionality, the actual 
test requires that we examine ―excessiveness,‖ as stressed in Additional 
Protocol I. Therefore, that ―proportionometer‖ cannot help determine pre-
cisely when one additional civilian death will ―tip the scale‖ and make an 
otherwise lawful attack disproportionate. Instead, ―focusing on excessive-
ness avoids the legal fiction that collateral damage, incidental injury, and 
military advantage can be precisely measured.‖30 Rather than a mathemati-
cal concept, therefore, proportionality is a guideline to help ensure that mili-
tary commanders weigh the consequences of a particular attack and refrain 
from launching attacks that will cause excessive civilian deaths. 
Critically, analyzing proportionality in any given situation also re-
quires an understanding of the correct perspective. As the very language of 
Additional Protocol I shows, referring to ―anticipated‖ military advantage 
and ―expected‖ civilian casualties, proportionality must be viewed prospec-
tively, not in hindsight. Instead, the information available and the circums-
  
 27 See AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(iii)(―With respect to attacks, the following precau-
tions shall be taken: (a) [t]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall: . . . (iii) refrain from 
deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.‖). 
 28 See AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(b) (―[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it 
becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or 
that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.‖). 
 29 See Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and 
Dynamics, 7 Y.B. OF INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 35, 48 (2004), available at http://journals. 
cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=671848&jid=YHL&volumeId=7&issueId
=-1&aid=671844&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession= (the military  
member will have to make a ―good faith, honest and competent decision as a ‗reasonable 
military commander‘‖ when evaluating and balancing incidental civilian losses and 
anticipated military advantage).  
 30 See generally Schmitt, supra note 25, at 293–301(discussing qualifying military objec-
tives and proportionality in attacks). 
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tances at the time of the military operation in question must govern how we 
approach the balance between military advantage and civilian casualties. 
Because combat, even a minor firefight, involves confusion and uncertain-
ty—the ―fog of war‖ —these ―decisions cannot be judged on the basis of 
information which has subsequently come to light.‖31 A second concern 
with a retrospective approach stems from the vastly different nature of mili-
tary advantage and civilian casualties. The former is abstract, has little or no 
emotional impact, and is difficult to convey in pictures, while civilian ca-
sualties are dramatic and emotional and ―lend themselves to powerful pic-
tures and strong reactions.‖32 Observers will often find it difficult to assess 
fairly whether collateral damage is excessive in practice because the mili-
tary advantage from an attack may not be immediately apparent. The retros-
pective approach can therefore lead to departures from the accepted applica-
tion of the principle of proportionality. 
The ―reasonable commander‖ forms the heart of this prospective 
analysis. Analogous to the ―reasonable person‖ in domestic criminal law, 
the reasonable commander is ―the reasonable man in the law of war . . . 
[and] is based upon the experience of military men in dealing with basic 
military problems.‖33 As numerous military manuals recognize: 
It will not always be easy for a commander to evaluate [whether an attack 
will be disproportionate] with precision. On the one hand, he must take in-
to account the elements which are available to him, related to the military 
necessity necessary to justify an attack, and on the other hand, he must 
  
 31 Canada, Reservations and Statements of Understanding made upon Ratification of AP I, 
§ 7 (Nov. 20, 1990), cited in CIHL, supra note 25, ¶¶ 196–197, at 332. Belgium‘s Interpreta-
tive Declarations Made Upon Ratification of Additional Protocol I, § 3 (May 20, 1986) also 
states that ―the only information on which [proportionality determinations] can possibly be 
taken is such relevant information as is then available and that it has been feasible from him 
to obtain for that purpose.‖). 
 32 Holland, supra note 29, at 47. 
 33 William V. O‘Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL 
PROBLEMS: WAR, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE 21, 28 (James E. White ed., 2009); see also 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO 
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 
50 (2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en. 
pdf [hereinafter NATO Bombing Report] (―[i]t is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an 
experienced combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage 
and to injury to noncombatants, [nor would] military commanders with different doctrinal 
backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories . . . 
always agree in close cases.‖); William J. Fenrick, Justice in Cataclysm: Criminal Trials in 
the Wake of Mass Violence: Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 539, 546 (1997). 
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take into account the elements which are available to him, related to the 
possible loss of human life and damage to civilian objects.
34
 
It may seem simpler to merely add up the resulting civilian casualties and 
injuries after an attack and assess the actual value gained from a military 
operation, because ―the results of an attack are often tangible and measura-
ble, whereas expectations are not.‖35 However, doing so fails to do justice to 
the complexities inherent in combat; the proportionality of any attack must 
thus be viewed from the perspective of the military commander on the 
ground, taking into account the information he or she had at the time. As 
Clausewitz wrote, ―[t]he great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar 
difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere 
twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or 
moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appear-
ance.‖36  
C.   The Historical Separation between Jus in Bello and Jus Ad Bellum 
Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions is the first modern 
codification of the long-recognized distinction between jus in bello and jus 
ad bellum. The preamble to Additional Protocol I then reaffirms that the 
―provisions of the Geneva Conventions [and] this Protocol must be fully 
applied in all circumstances . . . without any adverse distinction based on 
the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.‖37 This principle of equal application 
  
 34 BELGIUM, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 29 (1983), cited in CIHL, supra note 25, at 334; see 
also U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 16.45.2 (JSP 
383, 2004) (―the responsibility of the officer . . . would be assessed in light of the facts as he 
believed them to be, on the information reasonably available to him from all sources.‖), 
available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/82702E75-9A14-4EF5-B414-49B0D7A27816 
/0/JSP3832004Edition.pdf; CANADA OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 418(2) (2003) (explaining 
that ―consideration must be paid to the honest judgement of responsible commanders, based 
on the information reasonably available to them at the relevant time, taking fully into account 
the urgent and difficult circumstances under which such judgements are usually made‖ and 
emphasizing that any analysis of the proportionality test must be based on ―what a reasonable 
person would do‖ in the circumstances), available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/ 
publications/Training-formation/LOAC-DDCA_2004-eng.pdf. 
 35 Schmitt, supra note 25, at 294. 
 36 2 CARL VON CLAUSWITZ, ON WAR, ch. 2, ¶ 24 (1976). 
 37 AP I, supra note 2, at preamble. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions states 
that the conventions apply in ―all cases of war.‖ Similarly, in a 1963 resolution, the Institut 
de Droit International declared that the rules restraining conduct in war must be equally 
applied to all belligerents. Institut de Droit International, Resolution, ―Equality of Applica-
tion of the Rules of the Law of War to Parties to an Armed Conflict,‖ 50 (II) AIDI 376 
(Bruxelles, 1963). 
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can be found as far back as medieval writings on the laws of war. Major 
treatises emphasized that certain restraints in war must apply equally to all 
combatants; that ―whatever is permitted to the one in virtue of the state of 
war, is also permitted to the other.‖38 The principle took on even greater 
importance as the notion of just war gave way—somewhat—to a more neu-
tral conception of war with the rise of the nation-state in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. ―This view of violence as a process to be regulated in 
and of itself is what set the stage for the development of the modern laws of 
war, by severing their ‗historical dependence on the jus ad bellum.‘‖39 As 
Theodor Meron writes, ―[i]n contrast to medieval law, most modern rules of 
warfare (e.g., on requisitioning property and the treatment of prisoners of 
war and civilians, that is jus in bello) apply equally to a state fighting a war 
of aggression and to one involved in lawful self-defense.‖40 While interna-
tional law applies both jus ad bellum and jus in bello to all situations of 
armed conflict, therefore, the two legal frameworks serve different purposes 
and produce different results. Violation of the jus ad bellum—an unlawful 
use of force—constitutes the crime of aggression; a violation of the jus in 
bello, depending on the seriousness of the violation, is a war crime. 
For decades, international courts have upheld this essential separa-
tion and reinforced its importance for the fair and effective implementation 
of IHL. The most recent such case is Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber originally 
convicted two leaders of the Civil Defence Forces, a militia fighting to re-
store the legitimate government, of mutilation, amputation, hacking civi-
lians to death, and other brutal crimes.41 At sentencing, the Trial Chamber 
reduced their sentences because, although they committed grievous atroci-
ties, they fought for ―a cause that is palpably just and defendable.‖42 The 
Trial Chamber thus directly conflated jus in bello and jus ad bellum, expli-
citly accepting that those who fight in a just war bear lesser obligations un-
der the law of armed conflict. Were its decision to stand, it would have sent 
a clear message that IHL does not apply equally to all parties, a problematic 
result. On appeal, however, the Appeals Chamber flatly rejected this ap-
  
 38 Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 938 
(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2000) (1773). See also 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS 
OF WAR AND PEACE 1420–01 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005). 
 39 Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation 
of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 963, 966 (2008) (citing Judith Gardam, 
Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 391, 397 (1993)). 
 40 Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
1, 12 (1992). 
 41 Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Sentencing Judgement ¶ 
46, (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/470dd5a02.pdf. 
 42 Id. ¶¶ 86–88. 
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proach, finding that it violated the ―basic distinction and historical separa-
tion between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, . . . a bedrock principle‖ of 
IHL.43 In particular, the court emphasized that ―[a]llowing mitigation for a 
convicted person‘s political motives, even where they are considered . . . 
meritorious . . . provides implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally 
violates the law—the precise conduct this Special Court was established to 
punish.‖44 In a similar vein, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission rejected the African National Congress‘ claim ―that it should 
be judged differently than the apartheid government because it was engaged 
in a just war against apartheid.‖45 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has also emphasized the distinction between the two bodies of law, 
lamenting that ―[t]he unfortunate legacy of wars shows that until today 
many perpetrators believe that violations of binding international norms can 
be lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a ‗just cause.‘‖46 The 
Tribunal‘s response to such claims: ―[t]hose people have to understand that 
international law is applicable to everybody, in particular during times of 
war.‖47 The Tribunal‘s statement was a clear link to the Nuremberg Tribun-
al‘s similar rejection of jus ad bellum-based claims in jus in bello cases. In 
separating crimes under jus ad bellum from crimes under jus in bello, even 
though both often arose, the Nuremberg Tribunal consistently refused to 
accept the Prosecution‘s argument that Germany, as the aggressor, was not 
entitled to invoke rights and protections under IHL.48 For example, in the 
Justice Trial, the Tribunal declared: 
If we should adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a 
criminal war of aggression every act which would have been legal in a de-
fensive war was illegal in this one, we would be forced to the conclusion 
  
 43 Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 529–30 
(May 28, 2008), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY 
%3d&tabid=194. 
 44 Id. ¶ 534. 
 45 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 214 (2010). 
 46 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 1082 (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/47fdfb53d.html.  
 47 Id. See also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 
55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 173 (1997) (―application of the law is not condi-
tioned by the causes of the conflict.‖). 
 48 Moussa, supra note 39, at 985. 
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that every soldier who marched under orders into occupied territory or 
who fought in the homeland was a criminal and a murderer.
49
 
In the Hostages Trial, German leaders faced prosecution for crimes commit-
ted during the occupation of and campaigns in Greece and Yugoslavia. Re-
jecting the argument that the illegal use of force prevented Germany from 
invoking the law of belligerent occupation, the Tribunal emphasized that 
―[w]hatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or 
no[t] the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of international law 
are valid as to what must not be done, may be done, and must be done by 
the belligerents themselves in making war against each other.‖50 
IHL‘s effectiveness depends in many ways on this separation of jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum. If the cause at arms influenced a state‘s obliga-
tion to abide by the laws regulating the means and methods of warfare and 
requiring protection of civilians and persons hors de combat, states would 
justify all departures from jus in bello with reference to the purported just-
ness of their cause. The result: an invitation to unrestricted warfare. This 
article demonstrates one highly problematic example of how mixing jus in 
bello proportionality and jus ad bellum proportionality violates this long-
standing proscription and, in doing so, undermines the core of IHL—the 
protection of civilians from the ravages of war. 
III. LAWFARE—EXPLOITING THE LAW AS A TOOL OF WAR 
The problems inherent in conflating jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
are compounded by the growing use of lawfare, generally defined as ―the 
strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military 
means to achieve military objectives.‖51 Two aspects of lawfare are relevant 
to the instant discussion: strategic and tactical. The former occurs when 
technologically and militarily disadvantaged forces target public support 
and seek to force a political end to the fighting because of opposition to a 
seemingly extra-legal war.52 In essence,  
  
 49 Trial of Josef Altstötter et. al., 6 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM‘N, LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 2 (1948). 
 50 United States v. List (Case 7), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMES BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1247 (1948) (citing OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 51–52 (Long-
man 1920)). 
 51 Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military 
Lawyers at the Strategic Level, 2006 ARMY LAW. 1, 7 (2006). 
 52 See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994) 
(―[i]n modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base 
of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how wor-
thy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, 
inhumane, or iniquitous way.‖). 
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[R]ather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to de-
stroy the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispens-
able when democracies like the U.S. conduct military interventions. A 
principal way of bringing about that end is to make it appear that the U.S. 




The tactical piece occurs when the disadvantaged side—insurgents, terror-
ists, or others—openly violate the law of war to gain a tactical advantage in 
specific operations by handicapping the ability of the IHL-compliant mili-
tary to carry out its mission within the bounds of the law. The most classic 
way lawfare affects military operations and the implementation and en-
forcement of IHL is through challenges to the principle of distinction, as 
described in this section. However, as Section IV below will explain, law-
fare also contributes to and feeds off the mixing of the two proportionalities, 
leading to obfuscation in the enforcement of the law and greater opportuni-
ties for the exploitation of the law for strategic and tactical purposes. 
Distinction is one of the cardinal principles of IHL54 and requires 
that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are fighting and 
those who are not and direct attacks solely at the former.55 Similarly, parties 
must distinguish between civilian objects and military objects and target 
only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the basic rule:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 




Distinction lies at the core of IHL‘s seminal goal of protecting in-
nocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat. This purpose is em-
  
 53 Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian 
Values in 21st Century Conflicts 11 (2001), available at http://www.ksg. 
harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
 54 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10, ¶ 78 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, dissenting 
on unrelated grounds) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering 
are the two cardinal principles of IHL). 
 55 Exhortations regarding distinction date back to the Lieber Code: ―Nevertheless, as civi-
lization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially 
in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country 
and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more 
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as 
much as the exigencies of war will admit.‖ Lieber Code, supra note 22, art. 22; see also 
CIHL, supra note 25, Rule 1. 
 56 AP I, supra note 2, art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary international law. See 
CIHL, supra note 25, Rule 1. 
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phasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that ―[t]he civi-
lian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the ob-
ject of attack.‖57 The obligation to distinguish forms part of the customary 
international law of both international and non-international armed con-
flicts, as the ICTY held in the Tadic case.58 As a result, all parties to any 
conflict are obligated to distinguish between combatants, or fighters, and 
civilians, and concomitantly, to distinguish themselves from civilians and 
their own military objects from civilian objects. 
In recent conflicts, ―the most typical and also most damaging form 
of lawfare . . . has been the decision of disadvantaged combatants to not 
distinguish themselves from the local populace.‖59 By hiding amongst oth-
erwise protected persons and objects, such fighters take advantage of the 
more advantaged military‘s compliance with IHL principles and obligations, 
using both the law and the presence of civilian persons and objects as a tac-
tical weapon. The lack of boundaries between conflict areas and civilian 
areas in contemporary conflicts, between those actively participating in hos-
tilities and those who are not, therefore poses particular challenges for dis-
tinction. One news article described combat in Afghanistan as: 
The elusive insurgents blend easily into the population, invisible to Ma-
rines until they pick up a weapon. They use villagers to spot and warn of 
U.S. troop movements, take up positions in farmers‘ homes and fields, and 
attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes.
60
  
Iraqi insurgents used similar tactics during Operation Iraqi Freedom, wear-
ing civilian clothing when approaching American and British forces in order 
to get closer without seeming to present a threat.61  
  
 57 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(2). 
 58 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 110, 127 (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675) (―Bearing in mind 
the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all 
types, [the General Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of 
civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboration within 
the framework of progressive development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . 2. 
in the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all 
times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.‖); See 
also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10, ¶ 79 (distinction is one of the ―intransgressible princi-
ples of international customary law‖); CIHL, supra note 25, Rule 1; Abella v. Argentina, 
supra note 47, ¶ 178. 
 59 Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s ―Uganda Wall‖: A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction 
and An Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 241, 270 (2007). 
 60 Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, a Test of Tactics Under Strict Rules to Protect Civil-
ians, Marines Face More Complex Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at A6. 
 61 Id. Similarly, Afghan militants often pose as women to escape from firefights unseen. 
See Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM, July 6, 2009, 
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Storing munitions in mosques or hospitals, launching rockets from 
residential compounds, and generally fighting from within the civilian 
population without any distinguishing markings all create situations where 
an IHL-compliant military often appears forced to choose between engaging 
a legitimate target and endangering civilians. For example, Taliban militants 
have stored heavy weaponry in mosques and reportedly positioned two 
large anti-aircraft guns in front of the office of a major international huma-
nitarian aid organization.62 ―By shifting soldiers and military equipment into 
civilian neighborhoods and taking refuge in mosques, archeological sites 
and other nonmilitary facilities, Taliban forces are confronting U.S. authori-
ties with the choice of risking civilian casualties and destruction of treasured 
Afghan assets or forgoing attacks.‖63 Similarly, United States and allied 
forces in Iraq encountered multiple examples of insurgents using civilians 
as human shields, attacking from locations protected under IHL, fighting 
without wearing a uniform or other distinctive sign, and using protected 
places for weapons storage and command posts.64 Operation Cast Lead, the 
Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008–2009, faced the same challenges. 
Palestinian militants hid or stored rockets, missiles, and other munitions in 
mosques, hospitals, schools, and other civilian buildings.65  
When militants and other groups exploit IHL for tactical purposes, 
the net effect is to place civilians in greater danger. When soldiers cannot 
distinguish between civilians and fighters, or when fighters disguised as 
civilians launch attacks, innocent civilians end up in danger as they are 
trapped in the combat zone, used as human shields, or mistaken for enemy 




 62 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti and Kevin Whitelaw, Into the Thick of Things, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, Nov. 5, 2001, at 24 (―[h]eavy weaponry is being sheltered in several mos-
ques to deter attacks. The Taliban has even placed a tank and two large antiaircraft guns 
under trees in front of the office of CARE International . . . ―). 
 63 Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, Taliban Dispersal Slows U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2001, at 1. 
 64 See Dexter Filkins, The Conflict in Iraq: With the Eighth Marines; In Taking Falluja 
Mosque, Victory By the Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004; Tony Perry & Rick Loomis, Mos-
que Targeted in Fallouja Fighting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A1; Coalition Forces Con-
tinue Advance Toward Baghdad, CNN Live Event/Special, Mar. 24, 2003; The Rules of War 
are Foreign to Saddam, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 25, 2003; David Blair, Human Shields Disil-
lusioned with Saddam, Leave Iraq after Dubious Postings, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Mar. 4, 
2003, available at http://www.FPinfomart.ca. 
 65 ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE ―GAZA WAR‖: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 24, (Center for 
Strategic & International Studies 2009) (describing how Hamas used a mosque to store Grad 
missiles and Qassam rockets), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf; 
Jeffrey Fleishman, Charges Fly in Battle Over What Happened in Gaza, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2009, p. A1 (detailing how Hamas used a bunker beneath a hospital as a headquarters). 
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ger—the use of lawfare to mix jus ad bellum proportionality with jus in 
bello proportionality, to take the civilian casualties caused by the very fail-
ure to distinguish and use them to buttress claims of unjust war and the 
crime of aggression. 
IV. A NEW TWIST ON AN OLD STORY 
Contemporary conflicts abound with the latest buzzwords—COIN, 
collateral damage, targeted killing, zone of combat, ―hearts and minds,‖ and 
so on—but the issue at the heart of all of these is civilian casualties. Several 
factors have combined to create this critically important focus on the impact 
war has on innocent civilians, civilian property, and the ability of men, 
women, and children to carry out their daily lives amidst the horrors of 
armed conflict. First, international law has trained a spotlight on the protec-
tion of civilians in wartime since the horrors of World War II and the draft-
ing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949. One of IHL‘s primary purposes is 
the protection of civilians, as evidenced by the fundamental principles of 
distinction, proportionality, and humanity that lie at the law‘s very founda-
tion. Second, the development of modern smart weapons has made preci-
sion targeting possible, indeed the norm for advanced militaries, thus in-
creasing awareness of civilian casualties. Third, intensive media coverage, 
the Internet, and the twenty-four hour news cycle create fertile ground for 
immediate wide-ranging coverage of individual incidents and attacks in 
even the remotest parts of combat areas. Whereas in the past, civilian ca-
sualties from particular military operations or attacks might have gone un-
noticed by those outside the immediate vicinity, we now know of civilian 
deaths within hours of any given attack. The effect is to bring home the suf-
fering of the civilian population in real-time and in a way not seen before. 
On the most fundamental level, this increased focus on and aware-
ness of civilian casualties is a positive step, one that we should embrace in 
an attempt to mitigate suffering during armed conflict. No less, it comple-
ments mission fulfillment and military strategy in counterinsurgency cam-
paigns, in which gaining the support of the local population is a key factor 
in success. However, these developments have—unexpectedly and unfortu-
nately—a more troubling side as well. Insurgent groups and terrorists mani-
pulate and exploit this greater focus on civilian casualties—and concomi-
tantly on minimizing such casualties—to their own advantage through the 
tactics described above, blurring the lines between civilians and fighters. 
Not only do they do so to seek greater protection for their fighters, but also 
to use the resulting civilian casualties as a tool of war in and of themselves. 
This latter development raises significant concerns about the mixing of pro-
portionalities and the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. This sec-
tion will first detail the growing use of alleged violations of the jus in bello 
principle of proportionality to make claims of disproportionate force under 
the jus ad bellum before analyzing the strategic and operational ramifica-
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tions for combat operations and the impact on investigations and analyses of 
IHL compliance and accountability. Ultimately, this new twist on an old 
story has significant consequences for the application of IHL, for decisions 
to use force, and for the implementation of strategic, operational, and tactic-
al goals during conflict. Most of all, it places civilians in increasing danger 
because it encourages tactics and strategies that directly harm civilians. 
A. Use of Civilian Casualties and Alleged In Bello Violations to Find 
Ad Bellum Violations 
As detailed above in Section I, jus ad bellum proportionality focus-
es on whether the force used in self-defense is commensurate with the need 
to repel or deter an armed attack. Civilian casualties do not enter the equa-
tion. In contrast, civilian casualties, often referred to as collateral damage, 
are a primary factor in assessing jus in bello proportionality. Thus, one form 
of indiscriminate attack on civilians under Additional Protocol I is an attack 
in which the expected civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the an-
ticipated military advantage gained.66 This analysis bears only on whether 
the particular attack in question constitutes a violation of IHL, not whether 
the use of force itself was lawful. In the past few years, however, civilian 
casualties have been offered up as a hallmark of an unlawful use of force 
under jus ad bellum—a direct and problematic conflation of the two propor-
tionalities. 
United States operations in Afghanistan have begun to trigger ex-
actly this type of response from certain quarters. Thus, news coverage of a 
NATO airstrike in June 2007 that killed at least twenty-five civilians 
prompted a former Afghan government official to find ―a more sinister 
meaning behind the . . . spate of civilian deaths‖ and to suggest that despite 
United States claims of mistakes leading to civilian casualties, he was ―not 
convinced that [the United States was] doing this without intention.‖67 Simi-
larly, at least one report analyzing the extent of civilian casualties in Afgha-
nistan calls the war ―criminal‖ precisely because of the high number of ca-
sualties.68 Jus in bello proportionality requires that we assess civilian deaths 
in relation to the military advantage of the particular attack—in the first 
example, the NATO attack on an insurgent base in southern Afghanistan. 
This analysis must be taken in a prospective manner from the perspective of 
the commander at the time of the attack; that is, did the commander expect, 
  
 66 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(5)(b). 
 67 Aryn Baker, Backlash from Afghan Civilian Deaths, TIME, June 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1636551,00.html. 
 68 Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of 
Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting, CURSOR, Mar. 2002, http://cursor.org/stories/ 
civilian_deaths.htm. 
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or should he have expected, excessive civilian casualties relative to the mili-
tary advantage he anticipated gaining, based on what he knew at the time of 
the decision to attack the target. The frequent tendency to link civilian 
deaths automatically with IHL violations—a fairly constant theme today—
is in and of itself a legally problematic approach. Jus in bello proportionali-
ty cannot be assessed after the fact, when the urge to simply count the ca-
sualties and declare a war crime is powerful. Unfortunately, we see this 
mistake far too often in both media coverage and investigations in recent 
years.69 
Immediate claims of criminality after an attack that causes civilian 
deaths fail to adhere to the basic parameters of jus in bello proportionality, 
by eschewing the necessary prospective approach and finding violations 
based solely on an after-the-fact totaling of death and destruction.70 More 
importantly, for the instant analysis, the comments and reactions above re-
garding NATO actions in Afghanistan evince a troubling trend of using an 
attack that allegedly violates the jus in bello principle of proportionality to 
claim that the entire operation is unjust or unlawful. In essence, the steps are 
as follows: (1) an attack leads to civilian deaths, (2) claims are immediately 
made that the attack was disproportionate (under IHL) because civilians 
died (a faulty IHL analysis in the absence of intent or an indiscriminate at-
tack), and (3) claims are made that this disproportionate attack on a specific 
target automatically means that the entire military operation is a dispropor-
tionate use of force in response to an armed attack or threat. On the most 
basic level, the third step is fundamentally flawed because the jus ad bellum 
proportionality analysis rests on whether the use of force is proportionate to 
the objectives in repelling the armed attack—not on whether a particular 
target is legitimate under IHL. Beyond that, however, these claims manifest 
an inappropriate use of jus in bello to reach conclusions about the jus ad 
bellum. 
The most comprehensive example of this mixing of proportionali-
ties appears in the Goldstone Report, the report of the U.N. Human Rights 
Council on violations of IHL and human rights law during the 2008–2009 
conflict in Gaza.71 Instead of examining the scale and nature of the Israeli 
  
 69 See infra section III.B. See generally Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the 
Goldstone Report: A Critical Commentary, 12 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 347 (2009) 
(analyzing the problems with a retrospective approach to jus in bello proportionality). 
 70 Holland, supra note 29, at 47 (―Clearly, one cannot always attribute every civilian death 
after an attack to the attacker. . . . One cannot assess incidental civilian losses for which the 
attacker is responsible by simply conducting a body count. Such an oversimplification is as 
superficial assessing the quality of a hospital by only counting the bodies in its morgue.‖). 
 71 Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territo-
ries: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48, 
Sept. 15, 2009, available http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/ 
9/docs/UNFFMGCReport.pdf [hereinafter Goldstone Report]. 
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military response in relation to that which would be reasonably necessary to 
defend itself against the rocket attacks and prevent future attacks, the report 
focuses on the civilian casualties as the benchmark,72 even though civilian 
casualties play no role in jus ad bellum proportionality determinations. 
Israel responded in self-defense to an eight-year campaign of rocket attacks 
from Gaza that terrorized the civilian population of southern Israel.73 As the 
Goldstone Report documents, between April 2001 and December 2008, 
Palestinian armed groups launched more than eight thousand rockets and 
mortars into southern Israel from Gaza, including over five hundred in No-
vember and December 2008.74 Operation Cast Lead‘s primary purpose was 
to destroy the rocket launchers and the tunnels used to smuggle the rockets 
and launchers into Gaza from Egypt.75 Jus ad bellum provides the appropri-
ate framework for analyzing the lawfulness of Israel‘s response, based on 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Whether Israel‘s use of 
force met those requirements may be debatable, but the Goldstone Report 
departs from the accepted jus ad bellum proportionality analysis. 
Instead, the Goldstone Report uses its assessments of Israeli attacks 
on particular targets under jus in bello—faulty in many cases76—to reach 
conclusions regarding the lawfulness of Israel‘s overall response under jus 
ad bellum. In so doing, the report thus reaches the conclusion that Operation 
Cast Lead was ―a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, 
humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local 
economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon 
it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability.‖77 The Report 
does not examine whether Israel‘s objective of eliminating the rocket 
launchers and tunnels, and curtailing the ability of Hamas and other groups 
to fire rockets, was a proportionate response to the eight years of rocket 
attacks, which would be the appropriate jus ad bellum analysis.78 Rather, 
  
 72 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1023, 1683, 1690. 
 73 The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal 
Aspects, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 2009), paras. 15–16, http://www.mfa. 
gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/ 
Operation_in_Gaza-Factual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm. 
 74 Goldstone Report, supra note 71, ¶1630 (citing INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM 
INFORMATION CENTER AT THE ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE HERITAGE & COMMEMORATION CENTER 
(IICC), SUMMARY OF ROCKET FIRE AND MORTAR SHELLING IN 2008 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e007.pdf); see 
also Goldstone Report, supra note 71, ¶1634. 
 75 The Operation in Gaza, supra note 73, para 16. 
 76 For a comprehensive critique of the application of international humanitarian law in the 
Goldstone Report, see Blank, supra note 69. 
 77 Goldstone Report, supra note 71, ¶1690.  
 78 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 15, for a comprehensive discussion of the lawfulness of 
Israel‘s resort to force against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. 
File: Blank 2 Created on: 5/7/2011 11:15:00 AM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:41:00 PM 
2011] MIXING OF PROPORTIONALITIES 729 
 
this sweeping conclusion stems directly from selected incidents in which the 
Goldstone Report found civilian casualties excessive in relation to the mili-
tary advantage gained. In this way, the report‘s conclusion is a direct des-
cendant of the arguments made —and rejected soundly—at Nuremberg 
about the criminality of specific German acts based on the German war of 
aggression.  
Although, as explained above, past conflations have generally in-
volved using jus ad bellum violations to excuse jus in bello violations, the 
report‘s use of purported jus in bello violations to find an overall jus ad 
bellum violation is equally problematic. The same arguments appeared in 
media coverage of the conflict as well, with one editorial stating: 
―[w]hatever pretext Israel has cited for launching massive air strikes on the 
Palestinian-controlled Gaza strip over the weekend, the high casualty figure 
among civilians makes this military action totally unacceptable.‖79 This 
statement offers a clear example of how civilian casualties are simply subs-
tituted for the proportionality analysis required in the jus ad bellum, by di-
rectly disregarding the reason for the military operation, whether lawful or 
not under jus ad bellum, and treating civilian casualties as the definitive, 
indeed only, factor in any legal analysis. 
B. Strategic Impact on Contemporary Conflict 
The mixing of proportionalities in this particular way directly facili-
tates the burgeoning use of lawfare in today‘s conflicts on both the strategic 
and tactical levels. Lawfare at the strategic level seeks to chip away at the 
will of the technologically advanced military and country in an asymmetric-
al conflict and to undermine public support for the war, thus leading to a 
premature end to the conflict.80 Insurgent groups use lawfare strategically 
on two levels. First, they promote allegations of IHL violations in the do-
mestic and international media as a way to undermine support for the war 
because of public displeasure at alleged violations. Second, they use civilian 
casualties to introduce and bolster claims of unjust war, precisely the effect 
of the mixing of proportionalities discussed here. ―Civilian casualty inci-
dents are highly ‗mediagenic‘ events that tend to receive high levels of re-
  
 79 Editorial, An Unjust War, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at 6, available at 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/12/30/editorial-an-unjust-war.html. The editorial 
continued in this vein, declaring:  
Just how much ―collateral damage‖—the military phrase for civilian casualties 
caught in cross fires—is regarded as acceptable by Israel remains unclear. But to 
anyone with a sense of human decency, the figure is reprehensible, and the military 
action must be condemned in the harshest terms. It has made this Israel‘s unjust 
war.  
Id. 
 80 Dunlap, supra note 53, at 11–13. 
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porting by the press, and making the issue of civilian casualties more salient 
can lead the public to weigh the morality of wars against the importance of 
their aims.‖81 Examples of the latter approach abound throughout recent 
conflicts, even to the extent that the governments of Serbia and Iraq used 
this type of lawfare as a primary strategy to counter the effect of United 
States military might.  
 
The government of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia saw civilian ca-
sualties and collateral damage incidents as an effective means of splitting 
NATO‘s coalition through the corrosive effect that civilian casualties were 
presumed to have on moral judgments about the war, and it accordingly 




Similarly, the Iraqi regime inflated the numbers of Iraqi casualties during 
the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in an attempt to highlight what 
it called the ―criminal bombardment of Americans and British.‖83 This stra-
tegic use of lawfare through the conflation of the two proportionalities poses 
three significant challenges. First, it sparks media coverage of military op-
erations that encourages a retrospective approach to jus in bello proportio-
nality, even though a fundamental component of that principle is its pros-
pective view of decision-making. Second, it leads to significant errors of 
legal application in investigations and analysis of IHL compliance during 
military operations. Third, and most important, it consistently fosters a cli-
mate in which civilians are placed in ever greater danger, a result fundamen-
tally at odds with the goals and purpose of IHL. 
1. Media coverage and a retrospective approach to proportionality 
Civilian deaths are a horrible consequence of war, and while often 
unavoidable, should be minimized to the fullest extent possible. Indeed, one 
of the primary goals of IHL and, in particular, the Geneva Conventions, is 
the protection of civilians. Unfortunately, not only are civilians often in 
greater danger from military operations than in the past, but civilian casual-
ties are now a tool in and of themselves. ―News coverage is dominated by . . 
. the newest trend, civilian deaths, leaving coalition commanders to engage 
  
 81 ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH, MISFORTUNES OF WAR: PRESS AND PUBLIC 
REACTIONS TO CIVILIAN DEATHS IN WARTIME xx (2006), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG441.pdf. 
 82 Id. at 71 (citing BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, NATO‘S AIR WAR FOR KOSOVO: A STRATEGIC 
AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT 79 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365/MR1365.ch4.pdf.) 
 83 Id. at 161. 
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in an endless cycle of public apologies.‖84 While significant media attention 
on innocent civilian deaths is not only appropriate, but also critical, during 
wartime, the way in which that coverage is manipulated and encouraged for 
strategic purposes raises serious concerns. It is now quite common for me-
dia reports on civilian casualties caused by state forces, whether in Gaza, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Lebanon, or Afghanistan, to produce an immediate outcry 
and claims of criminal liability. Interestingly, reports of civilian casualties 
caused by militants frequently receive little, if any, attention. For example, 
there remains a general perception that United States forces—and the use of 
air power in particular—in Afghanistan are responsible for large numbers of 
civilian deaths, notwithstanding documented evidence that civilian casual-
ties caused by multinational forces are steadily decreasing and casualties 
caused by the Taliban are increasing.85  
Insurgents quickly see the strategic benefits of greater media atten-
tion to civilian casualties and claims of unjust war, including an erosion of 
domestic support for military operations, increased tension among coalition 
partners, and changes in strategy, targeting parameters, and tactics. As they 
increase their propaganda efforts, they have great motivation to use tactics 
that place civilians in greater danger, such as human shields, launching at-
tacks from civilian buildings and areas, and so on. As detailed below, this 
practice is perhaps the most significant result of the increased tendency to 
use civilian casualties as a marker of violations of jus ad bellum proportio-
nality. However, the link between the mixing of proportionalities and the 
increased media coverage of civilian casualties has a problematic effect on 
the application and understanding of IHL as well. The use of civilian casual-
ties to reach conclusions of unjust war depends first and foremost on a di-
rect and automatic link between civilian casualties and violations of IHL, or 
the jus in bello, which are then used to launch the claims of disproportionate 
uses of force under the jus ad bellum. Because all of these claims take place 
in the media—the so-called court of public opinion, in many ways—the 
pace is immediate and instant. The result is that civilian casualties become 
the IHL violation in and of themselves—and the subsequent effect is the 
application of jus in bello proportionality using a retrospective approach. 
Although the law demands a prospective approach in analyzing the propor-
  
 84 Allan Richarz, To Win the War in Afghanistan, the US Military Has to Beat the Taliban 
at the Propaganda Game: With Effective PR, the U.S. Military Could Win the War in Afgha-
nistan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/ 
Opinion/2010/0315/To-win-the-war-in-Afghanistan-the-US-military-has-to-beat-the-
Taliban-at-the-propaganda-game; see also LARSON & SAVYCH, supra note 81, at xxii (―[T]he 
issue of civilian casualties has become increasingly prominent in media reporting.‖). 
 85 See U.N. News Centre, Afghan Civilian Death Toll Jumps 31 Percent Due to Insurgent 
Attacks, U.N. Daily News Issue DH/5711, 1–2 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.un. 
org/news/dh/pdf/english/2010/10082010.pdf. 
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tionality of particular attacks under jus in bello, such an approach offers 
little benefit or appeal in the world of media coverage, where instant con-
clusions and graphic pictures are the key to success.  
Lengthy investigations into the commander‘s perspective at the 
time of the attack, what he knew or should have known and his expectations 
regarding civilian casualties and military advantage simply do not fit into 
today‘s media cycle. The easy math of the retrospective analysis—multiple 
civilian casualties therefore IHL violation—does, in contrast. For example, 
in September 2009, the NATO bombing of two tankers in Kunduz, Afgha-
nistan on the orders of the commander of the nearby German army base, 
killed over 130 people, including at least ninety civilians.86 The immediate 
reaction was that a violation of IHL must have been committed because of 
the number of civilian deaths, notwithstanding uncertainty about how many 
dead were insurgents and how many civilians. In fact, President Hamid 
Karzai of Afghanistan even suggested that the attack had targeted innocent 
civilians, issuing a statement that ―targeting civilian men and women is not 
acceptable.‖87 Events quickly unfolded showing precisely how the retros-
pective analysis of jus in bello proportionality feeds directly into the strate-
gy of claiming jus ad bellum violations to weaken support for the war and 
drive wedges between coalition members. Germany‘s Minister of Defense, 
Deputy Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff all resigned over the 
incident as public support for the German mission in Afghanistan wavered 
substantially.88 And yet, one year later, the federal prosecutor investigating 
the German commander for violations of both law and procedures dropped 
the case, concluding that he had violated no rules in ordering the airstrike—
based on the information he had at the time of the strike.89  
The investigation, using a prospective approach to proportionality 
and targeting, was no match in the propaganda world for immediate claims 
of civilian casualties and disproportionate attacks in the media. As this ex-
ample shows, the impact of media coverage of civilian casualties, particu-
larly as a strategic tool for insurgents, promotes a retrospective analysis of 
jus in bello proportionality. From there it is a quick jump to using alleged 
  
 86 Stephen Farrell & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., NATO Strike Magnifies Divide on Afghan War, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/ 
asia/05afghan.html; Kunduz Airstrike Relatives to Demand Compensation, NEW EUROPE, 
Nov. 28, 2009, available at http://www.neurope.eu/articles/97814.php; Kunduz Air Strike 
Victims to Get $5,000 Payout, The Local, Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.thelocal.de/ 
national/20100805-28981.html.  
 87 NATO Strike Magnifies Divide, supra note 86. 
 88 Germany’s Army Chief of Staff Resigns over NATO Airstrike in Kunduz, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4930694,00.html. 
 89 German Military Drops Case Against Kunduz Airstrike Colonel, DEUTSCHE WELLE, 
Aug. 19, 2010, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5926249,00.html. 
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jus in bello violations to claim jus ad bellum violations. This growing ten-
dency to apply incorrect legal standards is itself a problematic result of the 
mixing of proportionalities—its strategic and tactical impact is even more 
troubling. 
2. Investigations and analysis 
The mixing of proportionalities plays a role in the faulty application 
of IHL and related legal frameworks in international fact-finding reports 
and investigations as well. Just as the media and the court of public opinion 
fall prey to the seemingly irresistible tendency to equate civilian casualties 
with disproportionate force under jus ad bellum, so has more than one inter-
national or non-governmental report. Although this issue arises in reports by 
human rights groups as well, the most recent—and most far-reaching—
example appears in the Goldstone Report. As detailed in Section III.A. 
above, the Goldstone Report makes a sweeping conclusion that Israel en-
gaged in a disproportionate use of force in launching Operation Cast Lead, 
specifically based on particular attacks allegedly in violation of the jus in 
bello principle of proportionality. In doing so, the report makes two key 
errors: it conflates jus in bello proportionality and jus ad bellum proportio-
nality and it applies the former principle incorrectly. 
This article offers a range of arguments why conflating the two pro-
portionalities has a highly problematic impact on the strategic and tactical 
implementation of IHL on the ground and in policy and command centers. 
Beyond the impact on conflict on the ground, however, this trend raises 
concern solely from the perspective of legal analysis and interpretation. 
International conventional law and jurisprudence consistently reinforce that 
the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum must remain separate and one cannot 
be used to reach legal conclusions regarding conduct falling within the oth-
er‘s framework. And yet, we now see official international bodies doing 
exactly that.90 The effect will be to erode this fundamental separation be-
tween jus ad bellum and jus in bello, a troubling development. 
Along the same lines, the mixing of proportionalities seems to give 
greater incentive to use a retrospective approach to jus in bello proportional-
ity, notwithstanding the clear recognition that it demands a prospective ap-
proach. After all, if the retrospective approach can help create the justifica-
tion for claims of jus ad bellum violations, then it becomes more and more 
appealing. Doing so, however, goes counter to international and domestic 
precedent, which consistently upholds the prospective approach. Thus, not-
withstanding the extraordinary destruction Norway suffered when General 
Lohar Rendulic embarked on his ―scorched-earth‖ retreat in the face of the 
  
 90 See generally Ryan Goodman, Controlling the Recourse to War by Modifying Jus In 
Bello, 12 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 53 (2009).  
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approaching Russian army, the Nuremberg Tribunal assessed his actions in 
light of his judgment in the circumstances at the time, finding no legal vi-
olation. In a clear statement of the nature of the proportionality analysis, the 
tribunal stated: 
We are not called upon to determine whether urgent military necessity for 
the devastation and destruction in the province of Finmark actually ex-
isted. We are concerned with the question whether the defendant at the 
time of its occurrence acted within the limits of honest judgment on the 
basis of the conditions prevailing at the time. The course of a military op-
eration by the enemy is loaded with uncertainties, such as the numerical 
strength of the enemy, the quality of his equipment, his fighting spirit, the 
efficiency and daring of his commanders, and the uncertainty of his inten-
tions . . .. It is our considered opinion that the conditions, as they appeared 
to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly 
conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made. This 
being true, the defendant may have erred in the exercise of his judgment 
but he was guilty of no criminal act.
91
 
Likewise, the ICTY highlighted the reasonable commander approach in 
Prosecutor v. Galic, stating that the key question in assessing the proportio-
nality of an attack is ―whether a reasonably well-informed person in the 
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the infor-
mation available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian ca-
sualties to result from the attack.‖92 
Domestic courts have adopted the same approach, such as in the tri-
al of two United States servicemen for the death of José Couso, a Spanish 
journalist killed in the crossfire during a firefight in Iraq in 2003. Finding 
that it could not determine whether there actually was a sniper on the roof of 
the hotel shooting at the soldiers, the Spanish court held that in the absence 
of any evidence that the soldiers acted unreasonably, and given the tensions 
and confusion inherent in a hostile environment, it could not hold them cri-
minally accountable for Couso‘s death.93 Similarly, in reviewing the actions 
of the Israel Defense Forces, the Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that its role is to ensure that a military commander‘s decision falls within 
the ―zone of reasonableness.‖94 By encouraging a retrospective approach, 
therefore, the mixing of proportionalities contributes directly to a change in 
  
 91 XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1296–97 (1950). 
 92 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion (Int‘l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 93 Victoria Burnett, Spain: Court Drops Charges Against G.I.’s in Killing, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2009, at A9; 3 U.S. Soldiers Cleared in Slaying, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at A20. 
 94 HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander 56(6) PD 352, 375 [2002] (Isr.). See also HCJ 
1005/89 Aga v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip Area 44(1) PD 536, 539 [1990]. 
File: Blank 2 Created on: 5/7/2011 11:15:00 AM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:41:00 PM 
2011] MIXING OF PROPORTIONALITIES 735 
 
legal interpretation and standards, away from accepted practice and conven-
tional law. 
3.  The greatest danger—undermining civilian protections 
Beyond the misapplication of the law in conflating jus ad bellum 
with jus in bello, these practices have highly problematic results for the very 
people the law is designed to protect during armed conflict—civilians. ―The 
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello results in the uniform, 
neutral application of the latter, without reference to its distinctions between 
the rights and obligations of the parties.‖95 Such neutral application simply 
cannot exist in these circumstances, however. The use of civilian casualties 
as an automatic trigger for claims of war crimes and of unjust war—
regardless of the actual legal elements of either legal violation—holds the 
advanced military to an entirely different standard than the insurgent group. 
While the insurgent group faces what appear to be lower standards than 
those present in IHL, the military essentially faces a standard of strict lia-
bility rather than the standards actually set forth in both IHL and in the law 
governing the use of force. In the former, the law requires a measure of in-
tent to find an IHL violation, whether in the intentional killing of civilians 
or in the launching of an indiscriminate attack on civilians, one that violates 
the principle of proportionality under jus in bello. In the latter, civilian ca-
sualties are not a relevant factor at all.  
Once it creates an environment in which civilian casualties are a 
factor—albeit incorrectly—in the jus ad bellum proportionality analysis, the 
insurgent group has significant incentives to create situations leading to 
greater and greater civilian casualties. The more civilian casualties result 
from military operations, the more strategic power they can wield. Here lies 
the true danger for civilians: one party to a conflict benefits greatly—on a 
strategic and a tactical level—from civilian casualties and therefore creates 
an environment in which civilians are at greater risk for loss of life and 
property. Militants use civilian deaths to their advantage on a strategic level 
to undermine support for the military campaign both domestically and in-
ternationally. In pursuing their goal of gaining ―political leverage by por-
traying U.S. forces as insensitive to [IHL] and human rights . . . , opponents 
unconstrained by humanitarian ethics now take the strategy to the next lev-
el, that of orchestrating situations that deliberately endanger noncomba-
tants.‖96 Civilians thus become a pawn at the strategic level as well, because 
they are used not only for tactical advantage (e.g., shelter) in specific situa-
tions, but for broader strategic and political advantage as well. The strategic 
use of lawfare, in which the mixing of proportionalities plays a starring role, 
  
 95 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 239, 241 (2000).  
 96 Dunlap, supra note 53, at 12–13. 
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thus demands a greater tactical use of lawfare in order to generate higher 
numbers of civilian casualties, preferably at the hands of the advanced mili-
tary. 
This tactical exploitation of IHL has grave consequences for civi-
lian protection during conflict. Classic examples of this form of lawfare 
include feigning civilian status, human shields, suicide bombing, and 
launching attacks from civilian areas, to name a few.97 In addition to the 
primary goal of using civilians or presumed civilian status to launch attacks 
from behind the shield of civilian immunity, each of these practices also 
accomplishes the goal of creating ever-greater numbers of civilian casual-
ties. In turn, these casualties, usually viewed as the result of military attacks, 
contribute significantly to the use of alleged jus in bello violations to claim 
jus ad bellum violations and thus to the strategic goal of diminishing sup-
port for the war or military operation. Media reports, investigations and 
other public responses that accept this mixing of proportionalities and con-
flation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello—when it should be rejected—
simply enable the contemporary environment in which these tactics place 
civilians in great danger.  
For example, there is little uncertainty about the dangers that invo-
luntary human shielding poses for civilians; they are forced to surround or 
otherwise protect a target and often pay with their lives. Even when an at-
tack is called off because of the presence of involuntary human shields, who 
retain their civilian immunity and are not directly participating in hostili-
ties,98 the civilians suffer great psychological and emotional trauma at a 
minimum. Attacks from protected sites, such as hospitals and religious 
buildings, turn an otherwise protected site into a military facility and there-
fore a legitimate target under IHL,99 endangering the civilians who use those 
facilities.100 Most dangerous for civilians is the nearly universal practice of 
  
 97 See generally Jensen, supra note 59.  
 98 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 292 (2009); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT‘L SEC. J. 5, 31 
(2010); Nils Melzer, Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 
INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 991 (Dec. 2008); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. 
Government of Israel para. 36 [2005]. 
 99 Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that hospitals lose their protected 
status when ―used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.‖ 
GC IV, supra note 2, art. 19.  
100 Such attacks are unfortunately all too common in today‘s conflicts. See Human Rights 
Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), available 
at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203 (explaining how the Iraqi regime used hospitals as 
military headquarters); CORDESMAN, supra note 65, at 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (2009) (de-
scribing how Hamas uses mosques, houses and cemeteries for military operations and to 
store weapons); Jeffrey Fleishman, Fighting in Gaza Over, a Battle Over What Happened, 
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militants disguising themselves as civilians, intermingling with the civilian 
populations, and launching attacks (whether suicide attacks or other) while 
feigning civilian status. All of these practices violate the principle of dis-
tinction, which requires that fighters distinguish themselves from innocent 
civilians; the final example constitutes perfidy, which is a war crime.101 
When fighters intentionally disguise themselves as civilians in order to lead 
soldiers on the opposing side to believe they need not take defensive action 
to guard against attack, they commit perfidy. The natural consequence of 
such actions is that civilians are placed at greater risk, since soldiers pre-
viously attacked by fighters disguised as civilians may be more likely to 
view those who appear to be civilians as dangerous and respond according-
ly. Militants and insurgents clearly benefit from the confusion their behavior 
generates; civilians clearly suffer as a result. When militants have an incen-
tive to continue these tactics not only because of the immediate tactical 
gain, but also because of the broader and longer-term strategic benefits, 
these practices become more and more entrenched.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The mixing of proportionalities—problematic on a range of levels, 
as discussed above—thus operates counter to one of the fundamental goals 
of IHL, the protection of civilians and those hors de combat from the ravag-
es of war. Combating these unfortunate developments requires several ap-
proaches. First, militaries must continue to operationalize IHL effectively to 
meet the demands of these strategic and tactical challenges. The ISAF tac-
tical directive providing parameters for the use of force, particularly air 
power, provides an excellent example of these efforts,102 notwithstanding 
some suggestions that it plays directly into the hands of the Taliban. 
Second, continued efforts to ensure even and accurate application of the law 
in official reports and the media are essential to maintaining the internation-
al legal standards that protect civilians in times of war. Third, neither of 
these first two steps will be sufficient without continuing and increasing 
efforts to hold non-state actors accountable for violations of IHL, not only 
for direct attacks on civilians—where appropriate—but also for perfidy, 
  
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1 (detailing how Hamas used a bunker beneath a hospital as a 
headquarters).  
101 Article 37(1) of AP I forbids killing, capturing or injuring the enemy by resort to perfi-
dy, which is defined as ―[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe 
that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.‖ 
AP I, supra note 2, art. 37(1) (emphasis added).  
102 Press Release, ISAF, General Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive: Emphasizes 
―Disciplined Use of Force,‖ Aug. 4, 2010, available at http://isaf-live.webdrivenhq.com/ 
article/isaf-releases/isaf-commander-issues-updated-tactical-directive.html. 
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human shielding, and other violations involving the principle of distinction. 
Together, these three steps can counteract this unfortunate new twist on an 
old story 
 
